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Using longitudinal data of Spanish manufacturing companies, we study the dynamic, bidirectional
relationship between firm research and development (R&D) intensity and corporate diversification in
an organic growth setting. Our empirical approach accounts for the different sources of endogeneity.
Although we find a positive linear effect of R&D intensity on related diversification, the effect of related
diversification on R&D intensity assumes the form of an inverted U. Thus, the effect of related diversifica-
tion on R&D intensity is positive, but marginally decreases for moderate levels of related diversification.
Such an effect can become negative, however, for high levels of related diversification. Additionally, as aDiversification
R&D intensity
Dynamics
Organic growth
Endogeneity
Panel data
consequence of dynamics, the effects after one year are substantially lower than the overall effects that
occur over several years.
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p1. Introduction
The relationship between R&D intensity and corporate diversi-
fication has attracted considerable attention in empirical research
on strategic management over the last couple of decades (e.g.,
Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Chen, 1996; Miller, 2006;
Silverman, 1999). Although there is pervasive evidence for a lin-
ear and positive effect of related diversification on R&D intensity,
empirical evidence for the effect of R&D intensity on diversifica-
tion is mixed. Additionally, most empirical work has concentrated
on unidirectional relationships, and evidence off the potential
feedback between related diversification and R&D intensity is
lacking.
We attempt to reconcile contradictory findings concerning
the link between corporate diversification and R&D. We posit
a dynamic bi-directional hypothesis between related diversifi-
cation and R&D intensity, and we evaluate this relationship at
the empirical level. The dynamic nature of such a relation-
ship is sustained by the concepts of synergies and economies
of scope. This bi-directional link emphasises the endogenous
character of the relationship between corporate diversification
and technological resources (Baldwin and Scott, 1987; Miller,
2004).
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +34 914888049; fax: +34 914887786.
E-mail addresses: cesar.alonso@uc3m.es (C. Alonso-Borrego),
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tMost empirical studies of corporate diversification have focused
n the experience of U.S.-based companies (Wan and Hoskisson,
003).However, the institutional environment inwhichfirmsoper-
te influences their dominant growth mode. Studies, in which both
rganic growth and external growth are considered, do not dis-
inguish between the effects of these alternative growth modes.
hus, isolating the effect of organic growth by analysing a sample of
ompanies that makes use of only this growth mode is worthwhile.
We evaluated the theoretical hypothesis using information sup-
lied by the Survey of Business Strategies, a representative sample
f Spanish manufacturing companies, between 1990 and 2001. The
vailability of longitudinal firm-level panel data permits us to con-
ider the dynamic features of R&D intensity and diversification
ecisions as well as allows for the lagged effects distributed over
ime. This permits us to distinguish between the direct effect after
ne year and the full effect, which requires several years. To oper-
tionalise the simultaneous decisions regarding R&D intensity and
iversification as well as the potential feedback between them, we
stimate a bivariate vector auto-regression (VAR) for R&D intensity
nd related diversification, augmented by additional covariates. To
ncrease the robustness of our results, we also controlled for two
otential sources of endogeneity: censoring and unobserved firm
eterogeneity. The failure to account for either of these two sources
f endogeneity can lead to misleading conclusions.
Our empirical results provide evidence in favour of a bi-
irectional relationship between corporate diversification andR&D
ntensity at two levels. First, an increase in R&D intensity positively
ffects related diversification; innovation increases firm incen-
ives to establish businesses in related activities. Second, related
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of related diversification on R&D behaves as an inverted U-shaped
2 One explanation of Penrose (1995) for the process of related diversification over
time refers to efficiency gains from learning that result in excess resources, which
can be used to diversify.
3 Although R&D expenditure keeps increasing, it could be the case that R&D
intensity, defined as the ratio of firm R&D expenditure to total sales, falls. This phe-
nomenon is due to the relative increase in sales, associated with the firm additionaldiversification has a positive effect on R&D intensity, at least for
moderate levels of related diversification. In this situation, firms
undertaking related diversification may be more likely to innovate
to consolidate their position in new activities and make them more
efficient in implementingR&Dexpenditures. However,wefind tha
the positive effect of related diversification on R&D intensity is
marginally decreasing and may be offset when related diversifica
tion reaches a certain level. Our results suggest the effect of related
diversification on R&D intensity exhibits an inverted-U shaped
form.
2. Theory and hypothesis
The link between diversification strategy and R&D intensity
has been empirically analysed in several studies, which are sum
marised in Table 1. Empirical studies have adopted a unidirectiona
approach, and therefore, provide conflictingevidence. The common
finding is that diversification has a positive effect on R&D intensity
Among the few exceptions to this finding are the results reported
by Hill and Hansen (1991), who concentrated on very particula
industries, and those reported by Miller (2004), who focused on an
external growth framework. Evidence is contradictory with regard
to the effect of R&D intensity on diversification. Some authors find
a positive effect (Davis and Thomas, 1993; Hoskisson and Johnson
1992), while other authors find a negative effect (Hitt et al., 1996
Stimpert and Duhaime, 1997).
There are several possible reasons for these striking differences
First, the measures of these two strategic variables, diversification
and R&D intensity, differ across studies. In particular, many studies
do not distinguish between related and unrelated diversification
whose consequences can differ remarkably. Second, most stud
ies do not distinguish between growth modes, yet the dominan
growth mode can influence corporate decisions on both diver
sification and R&D intensity. Third, assumptions about the time
schedule of when the effects occur may affect the results. Fourth
differences in the methodological approaches can affect the con
clusions. The different approaches used in earlier studies, as shown
in Table 1, had a high probability of affecting the empirical findings
Nonetheless, and more importantly, none of the previous stud
ies analysed the bidirectional relationship of these two variables
Therefore, they ignored the potential feedback between these two
strategic decisions. To further the research, we propose and test a
new hypothesis that posits a dynamic bi-directional relationship
between related diversification and R&D.
Economies of scope and synergies play a key role in diver-
sifying firms, in general, and also in the particular case of the
mutual relationship between related diversification and R&D. The
analysis of economies of scope and synergies can be consid
ered from the viewpoint of outputs and costs (see Tanriverd
and Venkatraman, 2005). From the production perspective, inpu
complementarities may increase the value of a multiproduct firm
in comparison to a single-product firm through super-additive
value synergies among the firm’s different businesses (Davis and
Thomas, 1993). From the cost perspective, economies of scope
may reduce the unit costs of a multiproduct firm in comparison
to single-product firms by sharing resources between the firm’s
businesses (Teece, 1982) in the joint production process. Syner
gies and economies of scope are suitable for a firm that diversifies
among related activities but are not relevant in cases of unrelated
diversification.
From a dynamic resource-based view, a firm involved in sev-
eral related businesses should efficiently use its current resources
particularly its technological resources, and generate sufficien
resources tomake future strategies viable. This implies a long-term
dynamic interaction between related diversification and techno-  
logical resources.2 When a firm increases its degree of related
diversification by entering in a new business, the firm takes advan-
tage of its excess resources and acquires complementary resources
needed to operate (Chatterjee, 1990). Research indicates the closer
the relation with the previous business of the firm, the lower the
costs of entering in a new business (Yip, 1982).
If the firm grows through related diversification, the new activ-
ities can take advantage of the existing technological resources,
which will be exploited to a greater extent. This effect arises
as a result of synergies and economies of scope (Teece, 1982)
derived from the use of the firm R&D in their different businesses.
An increase in R&D investment may boost related diversifica-
tion, as long as it improves the capacity to exploit the available
technological resources. Further, the firm technology affects the
firm’s diversification strategy (Silverman, 1999) because the
greater the R&D investment, the greater the related diversification
(Burguelman, 1983).
In addition, the specificity of R&D can influence the firm
strategy on related diversification. Such specificity, which can
be due to (path-dependent) learning inside the firm and firm-
specific capabilities, may generate appropriability, both through
protection from imitation and through the use of complementary
resources (Helfat, 1994; Teece, 1986). Therefore, highly specific
R&D resources can provide the firm further incentives to related
diversification, to improve appropriability.
Related diversification, as part of a long-term corporate strat-
egy, tends to increase the expected return from R&D in two
instances: the greater the diversification, the better the capac-
ity to use research outputs (Teece, 1980). Consequently, a higher
degree of related diversification can favour R&D investment and
technology adoption (Hill and Snell, 1988; Chen, 1996). However, a
firm entering or strengthening a given business area might under-
take technology investments to improve its competitive position in
that business (Itami and Numagami, 1992; Lunn and Martin, 1986;
Scherer, 1984). Therefore, a firm introducing a certain degree of
related diversification may have incentives to increase its R&D.
There are some forces that may induce an opposite effect of
related diversification on R&D effort. These forces have to do with
the efficiency gains in R&D exploitation associated with (related)
diversification strategies (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989). From the
resource-based view, the optimal amount of additional resources
(particularly, technological resources) tends to decrease with the
number of related businesses. Technological knowledge is not lim-
ited to a particular business but extended to related businesses
(Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000). Thus, the complementarity of
technological resources in relatedactivities (Helfat, 1997) caneven-
tually reduce the optimal R&D intensity. In other words, the same
R&D investment has a greater impact the higher the diversification,
due to synergies and economies of scope (Baysinger andHoskisson,
1989; Miller, 2004), so the necessity to increase R&D is reduced.
As a consequence, related diversification may produce counter-
acting effects on R&D. We have argued that related diversification
boosts innovation, thus increasing R&D investment. However,
if related diversification increases the efficiency in the use of
technological resources, the need of further R&D effort may be
moderated.3 These two conflicting forces suggest that the effectrelated businesses, which is larger than the increase in R&D expenditure because of
the aforementioned economies of scope.
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Table 1
The unidirectional relationship between R&D and corporate diversification. Empirical evidence.
Type of relationship Study Diversification
type
Sign Growth type Sample Comments
R&D/Diversification Association Bettis (1981) Related + No distinction USA Related-constrained and Related-linked
categories
Bettis and Mahajan (1985) Related + No distinction USA Related-constrained and Related-linked
categories
Lecraw (1984) Related + No distinction Canada Related-constrained and Related-linked
categories
R&D→Diversification Chatterjee and Singh (1999) Related + Organic, External USA No influence of R&D on mode of growth
Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) Related + No distinction USA
Delios and Beamish (1999) Related + No distinction Japan
Hill and Hansen (1991) Related −
No distinction USA
Pharmaceutical industry. Diversification
and R&D compete on the fundsUnrelated
Miller (2004) Related − External, n.s. for
organic USA
Positive relation between related
diversification and organic growth
Unrelated
Miller (2006) Related + No distinction USA Negative effect after controlling for firms
having no R&D or in R&D intensive
industries
Montgomery and Hariharan (1991) Related + No distinction USA
Schoenecker and Cooper (1998) Unrelated − No distinction USA Computer and PC industries
Silverman (1999) Related + No distinction USA Detailed level of technological resources
analysis
Diversification→R&D Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989) Related n.s.
No distinction USA
Pharmaceutical industry. Modified version
of the concentric index to estimate synergy
Unrelated −
Baysinger et al. (1991) Related n.s.
No distinction USAUnrelated n.s.
Davis and Thomas (1993) Related + No distinction USA
Hill and Snell (1989) Unrelated n.s. No distinction USA R&D per employee
Hitt et al. (1991) Unrelated − External USA
Hitt et al. (1996) No distinction − External USA Diversification as control variable
Hitt et al. (1997) No distinction − No distinction USA
Hoskisson and Hitt (1988) Related n.s.
No distinction
Dominant business firms have a higher
relative R&D
Unrelated n.s.
Hoskisson and Johnson (1992) Related +
External USA
Restructuring effect on diversification
strategy and R&D
Unrelated −
Stimpert and Duhaime (1997) Related (4) − No distinction USA
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tion.function. Under such a scheme, the effect of related diversification
on R&D could be positive, but marginally decreasing and it may
eventually become negative for high levels of related diversifica-
tion. Such non-linearity, which means a more general framework,
may help to reconcile the empirical evidence of earlier research on
this topic (see Table 1).
Twoadditional elementsof the relationshipbetweenR&D inten-
sity and corporate diversification must still be considered: the
growth mode and the time schedule. Firms can grow through
different modes: internal or organic, external, and cooperative
(Tsang, 2000). Earlier empirical studies on this topic did not
distinguish between external and organic growth. In particu-
lar, the link between related diversification and R&D has never
been analysed in an organic growth setting. The lack of con-
trol for the growth mode may lead to ambiguous conclusions
about this link. The growth mode may affect the extent of
diversification and its relation with R&D intensity. In particular,
whereas internal or organic growth usually encourages related
diversification (Chatterjee and Singh, 1999) and vice-versa, exter-
nal growth is usually associated with unrelated diversification
(Chang and Singh, 1999). Furthermore, under the transaction costs
economics rationale, the possession of a highly specific set of
resources (e.g., technological resources) is associated with organic
growth.The dominant growth mode also depends on the transaction
osts associated with different governance structures (Williamson,
975). Governance structures are influenced byfirmcharacteristics
nd, very specifically, by the institutional environment in which
rms are involved (Hoskisson et al., 2004). Unlike countries sub-
ect to English common law, nations ruled by French civil law,
uch as Spain, suffer from relatively poor investor and creditor
rotection and weaker law enforcement (La Porta et al., 1997).
hus, capital markets in these latter countries are typically less
eveloped and narrower (Canals, 1997): the median value of the
nnual merger and acquisitions (M&A) activity in the US during
he nineties was twice that of the M&A activity in Europe during
he same time period.4 The legal system may then determine the
revailing growth mode in each country. Mayer and Whittington
2003) advocate the consideration of alternative environments to
tudy the topic of diversification. Clearly, the choices of the com-
anies under study impact the empirical findings. Most empirical
tudieshavebeen focusedonUScompanies,whereexternal growth
s thedominantgrowthmode.Companies located inmostEuropean
ountries are more prone to organic growth (Capaldo et al., 2009).
4 Calculation based on data from the Thomson Financial Securities Data Corpora-3
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instruments are the lagged values of the covariates, which are
7Our approach acknowledges the dynamic nature of the relation
ship between corporate R&D intensity and related diversification
These two strategic decisions have an inter-temporal nature
because their consequences have a lasting influence on the organi
sation and performance of the firm. The inter-temporal framework
whereby thefirmtakes into account the effect of bothR&D intensity
andrelateddiversificationoncurrentand futureperformancewhen
making its strategic decisions, has been acknowledged by, among
others,Helfat andEisenhardt (2004), in the context of relateddiver
sification decisions. Such decisions are constrained by the fact tha
changes in strategic variables entail costs to the firm that affect the
time period in which the firm will adjust to the new target levels o
such variables.5 Learning effects and organisational issues (Gran
and Jammine, 1988; Bergh, 1995) are among the primary causes
of such costs. In the economics literature, such costs are labelled
“adjustment costs” (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004).6 The major con
sequence of adjustment costs is that the behaviour of strategic
variables exhibits substantial inertia, which is reflected by the fac
that the current level of the strategic variable is strongly affected by
its past value. In this kindof context, the effect of anyvariable on the
level of the strategic variable is not instantaneous but is distributed
over several years. Consequently, the instantaneous effect of a vari
able change, or even the effect after one year, may be substantially
lower than the overall effect.
2.1. Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1. In a context of organic growth, R&D intensity and
related diversification show a bidirectional and dynamic relation
ship. Therefore, the overall effect of a variable change takes severa
years to be completed.
Hypothesis 1a. R&D intensity has a linear and positive influence
on the level of related diversification.
Hypothesis 1b. Related diversification influences R&D intensity
through an inverted-U shaped function. Hence, although the effec
of related diversification on R&D intensity is initially positive, i
marginally decreases and may become negative when there is a
sufficiently high level of related diversification.
3. Econometric issues
To test the hypothesis, we must first characterise a dynamic
model for R&D and diversification decisions that acknowledges the
simultaneity of both decisions. Our concern for the importance o
dynamic feedback has been expressed in earlier work. The lack o
accounting for such feedback effects (because of the use of a single
cross-section) results in the failure to establish a clear relation
ship between diversification and R&D. In his review of empirica
work, Bergh (1995) asserted that change over time has not been
accounted for empirically. Hill and Hansen (1991) contended tha
the underlying causal relationship cannot be determined by cross
sectional studies.
We allow for the potential feedback between R&D intensity
and diversification decisions through a dynamic model for the
joint decisions of both variables, conditional on further covariates.
5 In particular, if the optimal targets among the strategic variables imply large
changes, it may be more profitable to distribute such changes over a longer time
period until reaching the target level, instead of making the full change instanta-
neously, which would involve higher costs to the firm.
6 Empirically, this is reflected by the fact that lagged values of the strategic
variables will appear among the covariates of the equations characterizing such
a strategic decision. As a consequence, the immediate effect of a change in any
covariate will differ from the full effect (the total accumulated effect).  
The availability of longitudinal data allows us to characterise the
potential dynamic effects. In particular, our model consists of a
bivariate-augmented VAR model (see Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988) for
R&D intensity and related diversification, where each of the two
equations contains both lagged measures of the two variables.
Formally, denoting related diversification and R&D effort as d
and r, respectively, X as the vector of further covariates, and using i
to index companies and t to denote time periods, the equation for
each of the two strategic decisions can be written as follows:
dit=˛d1+d1di,t−1+d2di,t−2+ıd1ri,t−1+ıd2ri,t−2 + X ′itˇd + udit
rit=˛r1+r1ri,t−1+r2ri,t−2 + ır1di,t−1 + ır2di,t−2 + r1d2i,t−1
+r2d2i,t−2 + X ′itˇr + urit
(1)
We have used the sub indices d and r to distinguish the coeffi-
cients in the corresponding equations for diversification and R&D
effort; udit and urit are the corresponding error terms of the diversi-
fication and R&D equations. This dynamic structure will have two
major consequences. First, the interrelation between the two deci-
sion variables may follow a distributed lag structure, and therefore
thewhole interrelation effectmay take some time. Second, the total
or full effect of a change in any of the right-hand-side variables will
take several years to be completed, due to the presence of lagged
values of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of each
equation.
We took advantage of the empirical work in this area from
Merino and Rodríguez (1997), Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002), and
Miller (2006). Merino and Rodríguez (1997) studied the discrete
decision of whether or not to diversify, and these authors were
particularly concerned with the inconsistency bias of the esti-
mates due to the disregard of the unobserved firm heterogeneity.
They propose a proper econometric treatment that requires panel
data. Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) studied the role of agency
problems in profitability, taking into account dynamic effects, and
Miller (2006) reported a positive relationship between technolog-
ical diversification and performance based on a random effects
model.
The variables that we are considering are strategic; managers
base their decisions on expectations about future firmperformance
(Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003) so that managerial decisions are
endogenous. There are twopotential sources of endogeneity, unob-
served heterogeneity and censoring, which must be considered to
obtain appropriate estimates that guarantee robust results.
The problem of unobserved heterogeneity arises from the
existence of relevant unobserved firm characteristics that are
potentially correlated with the existing covariates. Under the
assumption that firm-specific unobserved characteristics are
invariant over time, the availability of longitudinal or panel data
may yield consistent estimates by means of a first-differences
transformation that removes the unobserved heterogeneity term,
whereas the parameters of interest remain unchanged after such
a transformation. The fact that there are endogenous variables
among the covariates (the lagged dependent variable, among oth-
ers) requires an instrumental variable procedure. The obviousuncorrelated with the error term. We can therefore apply a
7 Valid instruments should be uncorrelated with the error term of the first-
differences transformation, and correlated with the explanatory endogenous
variables. In a framework of dynamic decisions of firms, anyfirm-level variable asso-
ciatedwith firmdecisions or performance is hardly uncorrelatedwith the error term
(which reflects, among other things, unobserved firm-specific shocks affecting the
corresponding decision variables, either related diversification or R&D effort). This
usually invalidates contemporaneous values of firm-level as instruments. Anderson
and Hsiao (1982) and Arellano and Bond (1991), among others, prove that with
uncorrelated errors or moving-average errors, lagged values of the explanatory
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4.1
ing firms, recorded in the database Encuesta Sobre Estrategias
Empresariales (Survey on Business Strategies, ESEE hereinafter).10
8 Formally, denoting E(·) as the expectation operator conditional on the past val-
ues of R&D and related diversification and on the past and current values of the
exogenous variables, we have that E(ujit) = 0 for the whole sample, which is the
main conditions for consistency of theOLS estimator. But ifwe condition on the sub-
sample of observations for which yjit is strictly positive in two consecutive periods
(i.e., on the event that I∗
jit
I∗
ji.t−1 > 0), then in general E(ujit |I∗jit I∗ji.t−1 > 0) = ϕjjit /= 0,
since the unobserved error terms udit and urit are not independent of the discrete
choices on whether or not to diversify or innovate, respectively. Assuming normal-
ity, ϕj is the covariance between the error term in the equation of interest ujit and
the error term in the auxiliary equation for the decision to diversify or innovate,
respectively, in two consecutive periods. Also, jit , under normality, is given by the
inverse Mills’ ratio (see Heckman, 1978), based on the binary choice model for the
decision to diversify or innovate in two consecutive periods.
9 An alternative two-stage approach, based on Bover and Arellano (1997) and
Arellano et al. (1999), closely follows the Heckman two-stage procedure. Unlike
the auxiliary probit equation for no censoring, we could consider the estimation
of auxiliary equations for the censored variable yjit and obtain predictions of the
latent variable y∗
jit
for the censored observations. Then, we could estimate the model
with the full sample as if censoring had not taken place. We have also considered
this alternative approach (yet the estimates are not reported here). Given that the
proportion of censored observations is very large, however, particularly for related
diversification, our predictions for y∗
jit
were very imprecise and extremely sensitive
to the choice of variables in the auxiliary equation.
10 The ESEE is produced by Fundación Empresa Pública, a public institute financed
by the Spanish Ministry of Industry. The original dataset was designed with the aim
of ensuring the representativeness of Spanishmanufacturingfirms. For this purpose,generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator (see Hansen,
1982; Arellano and Bond, 1991). In particular, our estimation
approach consists of the system-GMM estimator proposed by
Arellano and Bover (1995) and developed by Blundell and Bond
(1998).
The second source of endogeneity arises because each of
the dependent variables (R&D intensity and diversification) is
censored. If we estimate each equation, restricting to the sub-
sample of observations those in which the dependent variable is
strictly positive at two consecutive periods, t and t−1, a sam-
ple selection bias may be introduced in our estimates. The proper
treatment requires characterisation of the firm’s discrete deci-
sion on whether or not to innovate (diversify) as well as the
firm’s decision regarding the amount of R&D intensity (diversifi-
cation).
The censoring problemarises because the decision variables can
be positive, but a large proportion of the observations will be equal
to zero (especially in the case of diversification). Therefore, the
observed decision variables have two components: a qualitative
component that corresponds to the strictly positive and zero-
valued observations, and a continuous component that describes
the range of positive values. We can write the equation of interest,
transformed in first differences so as to remove the time-invariant
firm-specific effect, as
y∗jit = W ′jitj + ujit (j = d, r) (2)
where y∗
jit
(j=d, r) denotes the dependent variable of interest (i.e.,
either dit or rit, respectively) in the absence of censoring, Wjit
is the vector of covariates (which includes the lags of the two
strategic variables), and j is its corresponding vector of unknown
coefficients that represent the corresponding effects of the covari-
ates. The dependent variable that we observe can nevertheless be
described as
yjit =
{
y∗
jit
if I∗
jit
> 0
0 if I∗
jit
≤ 0
(j = d, r) (3)
where I∗
jit
determines the censoring (i.e., whether or not the firm
does innovate/diversify), in accordance with the auxiliary equation
I∗jit = Z ′jitj + vjit (j = d, r). (4)
In the case of the R&D intensity (diversification) decision, I∗
jit
denotes the marginal net revenue of such a decision so that we
will observe a firm innovating (diversifying) if the marginal net
revenue of R&D intensity (diversification) is positive; otherwise,
the firm will not innovate (diversify). In principle, both the right-
hand-side variables (and thus the censoring mechanism) and the
magnitudes of their effects need not coincide in the equation of
interest that determines the positive amount of R&D (diversifi-
cation) or in the auxiliary equation describing the marginal net
revenue of the qualitative decision on whether or not to innovate
(diversify).
The parameters of interest can be consistently estimated
through the subsample of positive observations using a two-stage
procedure (Heckman, 1978). When conditioning on the subsample
of observations for which yjit is strictly positive in two consecu-
tive periods (i.e., conditioning on the event that I∗
ji
t
I∗
ji,t−1 > 0), our
equation of interest can now be written as
y∗ = W ′  + ϕ  + v (j = d, r), (5)jit jit j j jit jit
endogenous variables become valid instrument in the first-differences transforma-
tion of the original equations.
all
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ere ϕjjit is a selectivity correction term, which accounts for the
ple selection bias that arise when conditioning on the subsam-
of positive observations (see Amemiya, 1984).8
If jit were observed, we can introduce it as an additional vari-
le in the equation of interest. However, jit is unobserved but can
estimated for each non-censored observation through the aux-
ry equation about the qualitative decision on whether or not
diversify (innovate), using a binary choice model. Afterwards,
predictions of the selectivity correction term, jit, can be intro-
ced in the corresponding equation of interest (5) as an additional
ressor. Estimatingwithout taking proper account of the possible
ection bias can lead to inconsistent estimates if the selection is
dogenous, if ϕj /= 0.
Onceafirmhasdecided todiversify or to spend inR&D,however,
se decisions appear to be strongly entrenched. The transition
babilities for the events of diversifying or R&D spending are,
pectively, 87% and 91% in our sample, indicating that, once
condition on non-censored observations, the selection bias is
stly time-invariant, so that it can be subsumed in the fixed
ect, which disappears when we apply the first differences trans-
mation. We would thus expect these estimates to be similar
those that use a selectivity correction term as an additional
ressor.9
The proper econometric treatment of these problems will gen-
llyproduce larger standarderrorsof theestimates, and therefore
er precision in comparison with other approaches that dis-
ard these sources of endogeneity. Ignoring these problems,
wever, would lead to inconsistent, and therefore, meaningless
imates, regardless of their level of precision.
Data and variables
. Data
The data set is an unbalanced panel of Spanish manufactur-companies with more than 200 employees were surveyed (and approximately
completed the survey), and smaller companies with more than 10 employ-
were selected on the basis of a stratified sampling. It is important to note that
unbalanced feature of the panel implies that the time period during which we
erved the different companies was unequal, reflecting the fact that such compa-
s may enter and exit from the survey (in the same way that companies appear
5
  
Table 2
Correlation matrix.
R&D Unrelated div. Related div. Firm size Firm age (years) Advertising exp.
Unrelated div. 0.1311§
Related div. 0.0616† −0.0086
Firm size 0.2969§ 0.0241 −0.0266
Firm age (years) −0.0025 0.0124 0.0892§ 0.1331*
Advertising exp. 0.0085 −0.0756† −0.0219 −0.0532 0.2426§
ln(Sales) 0.0803§ −0.0033 0.0225 0.5877§ 0.2251§ 0.2158§
* Significance at the 10 percent level.
† Significance at the 5 percent level.
§ Significance at the 1 percent level.
This database was previously used by Merino and Rodríguez
(1997) and others in the analysis of corporate diversification. It
contains annual information for a large number of Spanish com-
panies whose main activity was manufacturing between 1990 and
2001.
Our final sample consisted of 513 non-energy manufacturing
companies, with at least 25 employees, operating in at least two
markets, and whose geographic scope was national or wider.11 We
also required that the company’s situation was not substantially
altered during the sample period. Therefore, we discarded mergers
or splits, as well as companies whose main activity changed during
the sample period (defined at the two-digit industry level). Based
on these criteria, less than 4% of the observations were removed,
including companies that were generally older and larger than the
companies that remained in the sample, which carried out only
organic growth strategies during the period analysed. Table A.1
shows the sample distribution of companies by two-digit industry
and by size.
5. Variables and measures
We defined R&D intensity as R&D expenditure based on a pro-
portion of a firm’s sales, consistent with earlier related work, such
as Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989) and Hitt et al. (1997), among
others. We used the entropy index as a diversification measure
(Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985), which is widely used
in strategy research. The validity of this measure was analysed in
several studies (Robins and Wiersema, 1995, 2003). This measure
is defined as
d =
∑
s
Ps × ln
(
1
Ps
)
,
where the sub index s represents the sth product segment. The
entropy index is thus a weighted average of the sales attributed
to each firm’s segment, Ps. The weights are the natural logarithm
of the inverse of the segment’s sales, ln(1/Ps). This entropy index is
additive, so that it can be broken down as the sum of the indices of
related and unrelated product diversification, dR and dU. The first
index, dR, captures the diversification across four-digit SIC indus-
tries within each two-digit industry (with two-digit firm’s sales
as the reference). The second index, dU, captures diversification
across two-digit industries (with overall firm’s sales as the refer-
ence). For the diversification equation, we focus on related product
diversification as the dependent variable.
and disappear in the economy). Restricting the sample of companies to be observed
to the same time period would affect the randomness of the sample. Instead, to
obtain sufficient information concerning firm dynamics, we only required sample
companies to have full information available on all the relevant variables for at least
five consecutive years between 1990 and 2001.
11 The rationale for these last two restrictions is that, in general, the potential role
of diversification (and probably innovation) is quite small in the case of companies
focused on local markets and/or those that are relatively small.We considered several control variables. First, we included the
natural logarithm of firm employment to control for its size. The
influence of firm size on diversification has been supported in
several studies, such as Bettis (1981), Hill and Snell (1988), or
Hoskisson et al. (1993), which reported a significant correlation.
In the case of R&D intensity, however, the influence of firm size on
R&D intensity remains controversial (King et al., 2003: 591).
Furthermore, in the level estimations, we included industry
dummies (at the level of the firm’s two-digit SIC major industry)
that interacted with time dummies to control for heterogeneity
in the firm environment, which is associated with the operating
industry and can vary over time (see Bergh, 1995; McGahan and
Porter, 1997, among others). For example, the aggregate level of
industry R&D may affect both the relative R&D intensity at the firm
level and their propensity to introduce new products (Baysinger
and Hoskisson, 1989).
We also included age dummies, for which we chose the fol-
lowing age groups: less than 10 years, between 10 and 20 years,
between 20 and 40 years, and older than 40 years. Age dummies
capture the potential effect of the maturity of the firm, and there-
fore the accumulated know-how of the firm, on R&D intensity and
diversification decisions. The direct use of age is precluded due to
the unreliability of such a measure for older firms (Alonso-Borrego
and Collado, 2002). As additional firm-level variables, we included
sales (in logarithms) and advertising intensity (ratio of advertising
expenditure to sales).12
The simple correlations among the main variables are reported
in Table 2. The positive correlation between R&D intensity and
related diversification is noteworthy. In addition, firm size appears
positively correlatedwith R&D intensity but notwith related diver-
sification. Finally, age appears to be correlated with diversification
but not with R&D intensity. These findings suggest that the matu-
rity of the firm, rather than its size, is relevant to diversification.
The opposite is true for R&D intensity. Nevertheless, the correlation
analysis disregards the censored nature of the decision variables as
well as the interactionbetween thepotential explanatory variables.
In the upper part of Table 3, we report the means and standard
deviations of the variables of interest for the full sample. Given the
censored nature of our decision variables, however, the statistics
were broken down depending on whether both R&D intensity and
related diversificationwere zero or positive.We observed that zero
R&D intensity and zero diversification are more likely when the
firm is smaller and/or younger. There appears to be no link, how-
ever, between censoring in any of the two decision variables and
sales. Furthermore, advertising expenditure seems to be higher for
12 Wealso includedfirmcharacteristics andother variables. Asfirmcharacteristics,
we considered whether the firm has industrial establishments abroad (to approx-
imate international diversification) or belongs to an enterprise group. As strategic
variables, we considered the firm market share in its main market (as a measure
of its market power) as well as measures of firm liquidity and leverage. These lat-
ter variables, however, were not statistically relevant in our analysis. Therefore, the
results obtained using these latter variables are not reported.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics: means and standard deviations of the relevant variables.
R&D Unrelated div. Related div. Firm size Firm age (years) Advertising exp. ln(Sales)
Full sample
0.0130 0.0518 0.0569 572.3 32.96 2.28 15.13
(0.0263) (0.1601) (0.1711) (1234.6) (26.70) (3.98) (1.35)
Subsamples
Related diversification=0
R&D=0 0 0.0358 0 255.6 29.11 1.70 14.41
(0.1382) (625.9) (25.00) (3.07) (1.24)
R&D>0 0.0190 0.0554 0 652.2 33.46 2.66 15.46
(0.0301) (0.1652) (1254.4) (27.77) (4.52) (1.27)
All 0.0124 0.0486 0 537.1 31.94 2.33 15.09
(0.0260) (0.1565) (1122.1) (26.90) (4.09) (1.36)
Related diversification>0
R&D=0 0 0.0613 0.3883 344.4 37.12 1.14 15.30
(0.1708) (0.2531) (362.6) (22.89) (1.43) (1.22)
R&D>0 0.0231 0.0793 0.4939 1024.5 41.31 2.26 15.42
(0.0308) (0.1874) (0.2038) (2197.9) (24.41) (3.31) (1.29)
All 0.0173 0.0748 0.4675 834.1 40.26 1.98 15.39
(0.0285) (0.1829) (0.2210) (1884.6) (24.02) (2.99) (1.27)
Standard deviations in parentheses below.
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linnovating firms (i.e., those with positive R&D intensity), but aver-
age advertising expenditure is not significantly different between
diversifying and non-diversifying firms. Finally, the probability of
positive R&D intensity is higherwhen diversification is greater, and
vice versa.
6. Results
To illustrate the aforementioned consequences of ignoring the
potential endogeneity problems, we report alternative estimates
based on different statistical assumptions. Table 4 shows the pre-
liminary estimateswith alternative treatments of censoring,whose
consistency depends on the absence of firm-specific unobserved
heterogeneity. Our preferred estimates, which take into account all
the potential sources of endogeneity, are reported in Table 5. The
alternative treatments of censoring in Table 4 range from the ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) and truncated OLS estimates to the tobit
and generalised selection models.13 In all these specifications, we
previously removed any additional covariate that was statistically
non-significant.
Not surprisingly, the coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable was large and strongly significant in both equations, irre-
spective of the estimation method.14 We also observed that the
alternative treatments of censoring induced striking differences
in the estimated effects. In particular, the substantial differences
between the tobit and generalised selection reveal the rejec-
tion of the tobit constraints, so that the factors determining the
discrete decisions on whether to innovate or diversify seem to
differ from the factors behind the magnitude of R&D intensity or
diversification.15
13 Notice thatOLS estimateswith the full samplewill be inconsistent due to the fact
that a significant fraction of the observations for the dependent variables is censored
at zero. By the same token, OLS estimates with the truncated sample of strictly
positive observations (that is, uncensored observations) will also be inconsistent, as
the sample selection bias, after excluding censored observations, is not taken into
account.
14 When unobserved heterogeneity is ignored, the absolute value of the estimated
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is typically oversized.
15 Regarding the diversification equation, the likelihood of the tobit model did
not converge so that their associated estimates are actually unreliable. This fact
also provides evidence against the tobit constraints and supports the generalized
a
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eTable 5 shows the estimates based on a dynamic panel data esti-
ation that explicitly take into account unobserved heterogeneity,
ogether with the censoring problem of the dependent variables.
e also provide standard errors appropriately corrected from
otential finite-sample bias, as proposed by Windmeijer (2004).
n both equations, we introduced the explanatory variables lagged
ne period, except for our two strategic variables, which we intro-
uced the first two lags. For each equation, the first two columns
how the unrestricted estimates (with and without the selectivity
orrection term).
Our preferred estimates, for which we removed the lags that
ere clearly non-significant, are shown in the last two columns.16
lthough most qualitative findings from the earlier estimates in
able 4 remained, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients
ere remarkably different. In particular, the estimated coeffi-
ients corresponding to the lagged dependent variable in both
quations were substantially smaller, in accordance with the exis-
ence of unobserved firm heterogeneity. Therefore, when ignoring
nobserved heterogeneity, we would be interpreting the spurious
orrelation between unobserved firm effects and the covariates as
urther persistence in the dependent variable.
In any case, the significance of the lagged dependent variables
nderlines the inertia, which we can attribute to the existence of
ignificant learning effects, behind the decisions on R&D intensity
nd related diversification. Both in the R&D and the diversifica-
ion equations, the selectivity correction term was significant at
sual levels. In both cases, however, the results were very similar
o the results of equations that exclude this term, and therefore,
he assumption that sample selection bias is approximately time-
nvariant and can be subsumed into the firm-specific effect seems
ppropriate. We concentrate our discussion on the corresponding
ast columns for each equation.
In the diversification equation, the lagged endogenous variable
t t−1 and t−2 was significant, and the coefficients decrease with
he time lag. The large estimated coefficients show the existence of
election model where the sample selection term, given by the inverse of Mills’
atio, appears to be significant.
16 Any variable kept constant over time after applying the fixed effects of trans-
ormation was not considered, because the fixed-effects of transformation would
liminate it. In particular, age effects were not taken into account.
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Table 4
Preliminary estimates.
Variable Diversification equation R&D equation
OLS Truncated
OLS
Tobit Generalised
selection
OLS Truncated OLS Tobit Generalised
selection
R&D (t−1) 0.1504† 0.3666 1.3016§ 0.5756† 0.5814§ 0.5593§ 0.6632§ 0.5669§
(0.0590) (0.2980) (0.0000) (0.2704) (0.0890) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0178)
Unrelated diversification (t−1) 0.0073 −0.0118 0.0989§ 0.0201 0.0098 0.0024 0.0251† 0.0040
(0.0091) (0.0548) (0.0000) (0.0493) (0.0089) (0.0138) (0.0122) (0.0132)
Squared Unrelated diversification (t−1) −0.0175 −0.0047 −0.0380* −0.0071
(0.0145) (0.0227) (0.0198) (0.0218)
Related diversification (t−1) 0.8658§ 0.5488§ 1.7956§ 0.8764§ 0.0119† 0.0184† 0.0158* 0.0187†
(0.0082) (0.0395) (0.0000) (0.0573) (0.0060) (0.0096) (0.0083) (0.0092)
Squared Related diversification (t−1) −0.0104 −0.0182 −0.0120 −0.0185
(0.0082) (0.0141) (0.0118) (0.0135)
Size −0.0006 −0.0065 0.0104 −0.0052 0.0031§ 0.0043§ 0.0049§ 0.0045§
(0.0032) (0.0251) (0.0000) (0.0225) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Young firm (Y/n) 0.0023 −0.0419 −0.0315§ −0.0273 0.0011 0.0027 0.0008 0.0025
(0.0047) (0.0366) (0.0000) (0.0327) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0017)
Advertising exp. (t−1) −0.0002 0.0022 −0.0015 0.0007 0.0002§ 0.0002 0.0004§ 0.0002†
(0.0004) (0.0031) (0.0000) (0.0028) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ln(Sales) (t−1) 0.0014 0.0045 0.0228§ 0.0135 −0.0018§ −0.0040§ −0.0002 −0.0037§
(0.0026) (0.0211) (0.0000) (0.0188) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Lambda 0.1498§ 0.0032†
(0.0173) (0.0014)
Number of observations 3508 375 3508 3508 3508 2248 3508 3508
R-squared 0.79 0.75 0.51 0.51
Chi2 1084.49 2552.45
Log-likelihood 3933.38 280.28 −343.13 8972.07 5375.46 4478.18
The estimation method is indicated in the lower upper part of each column. None of the estimates reported in this Table are consistent in the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity. The lag (t−1) is indicated to the left of each variable. Standard errors are in parentheses below each estimated coefficient. The variable lambda denotes
the selectivity correction term in the generalised selection model. Time dummies, industry dummies and interactions between them are included in all equations. Chi2
(whenever applicable) is a test of joint significance of all the covariates (excluding the constant). The joint significance test evaluates the hypothesis that the coefficients of
related diversification and squared related diversification are jointly equal to zero.
* Significance at the 10 percent level.
† Significance at the 5 percent level.
§ Significance at the 1 percent level.
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There are two potential causes of such a loss of precision: the transformation
needed to remove the unobserved individual heterogeneity component and intro-
duction of an estimated selectivity correction term rather than an actual (unknown)
selectivity correction term.substantial inertia in related diversification. Neither the AR(2) nor
theHansen-Sargan testprovidedevidenceagainst the specification.
In addition, size (measured by the logarithm of employment) had
a slightly negative effect, whereas advertising and sales were not
significant. Interestingly, we found a one-to-one immediate effect
of R&D intensity on related diversification so that an increase in
R&D intensity by one percentage point implied a 0.01 increase in
related diversification. This result clearly supports Hypothesis 1a,
which establishes that R&D intensity positively influences related
diversification.
In the R&D intensity equation, the lagged endogenous vari-
able at t−1 and t−2 is significant, demonstrating that R&D
dynamics are quite rich. In addition, related diversification has
a positive effect on R&D, significant at the 10% level. Addition-
ally, the estimated coefficient of square related diversification
has the opposite sign, indicating that related diversification stim-
ulates R&D at moderate levels of diversification, yet a positive
effect decreases as the level of related diversification increases
and may eventually become negative. This coefficient was also
significant at the 10% level. This result supports Hypothesis 1b,
whereby the influence of related diversification on R&D inten-
sity assumes an inverted U-shaped function. We also implemented
a test of joint significance of related diversification and its
square, obtaining a p-value slightly below 20%, so that evidence
was not fully conclusive. We attribute this result to the fact
that our estimation approach provides robust estimates at thexpense of a larger variance-covariance matrix of the estimated
oefficients.17
Regarding unrelated diversification, we found no significant
ffect on R&D intensity. Other additional variables, such as size,
dvertising, and sales, were not significant at any reasonable level.
he AR(2) specification test for the existence of an error auto-
orrelation in the untransformed model did not provide evidence
gainst the specification and the p-valuewas clearly above 20%. The
ansen-Sargan test, however, was not so conclusive.
It is worth noting that the two coefficients on diversification
nd squared diversification cannot be interpreted separately, as the
ffect of related diversification on R&D depends critically on the
evel of diversification. From the estimated numerical values of the
oefficients of related diversification and squared related diversi-
cation, we computed the level after which additional increments
n related diversification implied a negative effect of this variable
n R&D intensity. This level is approximately 0.30, which seems
uite high when compared with the full sample, for which the
verage value of related diversification is below 0.06. For those
rms already diversifying, however, the related diversification
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Table 5
Dynamic panel data estimation.
Variable Diversification equation R&D equation
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
R&D (t−1) 1.4252§ 1.3300§ 0.8116* 1.0105§ 0.4058† 0.4015† 0.3936* 0.3871*
(0.5522) (0.0536) (0.4605) (0.3939) (0.2070) (0.2029) (0.2338) (0.2311)
R&D (t−2) −0.5347 −0.4209 0.3264† 0.3241† 0.3434* 0.3435*
(0.4184) (0.3332) (0.1666) (0.1630) (0.1944) (0.1910)
Related diversification (t−1) 0.4622§ 0.4252§ 0.4480§ 0.4263§ 0.1049 0.1071 0.0742* 0.0735*
(0.1078) (01020) (0.1045) (0.0991) (0.0892) (0.0918) (0.0392) (0.0420)
Related diversification (t−2) 0.2400§ 0.2168§ 0.2572§ 0.2198§ −0.0447 −0.0438
(0.0711) (0.0731) (0.0738) (0.0673) (0.0837) (0.0887)
Squared Related diversification (t−1) −0.1380 −0.1433 −0.1242* −0.1258*
(0.0965) (0.1013) (0.0878) (0.0716)
Squared Related diversification (t−2) 0.0318 0.0301
(0.0811) (0.0904)
Unrelated diversification (t−1) −0.0098 −0.0094 −0.0111 −0.0115
(0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0156) (0.0171)
Squared Unrelated diversification (t−1) 0.0136 0.0133 0.0173 0.0153
(0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0219) (0.0213)
Size (t−1) −0.0618† −0.0765§ −0.0540 −0.0768§ 0.0039 0.0044 0.0041 0.0045
(0.0310) (0.0298) (0.0359) (0.0290) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Advertising exp. (t−1) 0.0001 0.0003 0.0008 0.0003 −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0002* −0.0002
(0.0065) (0.0061) (0.0072) (0.0054) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ln(Sales) (t−1) 0.0318 0.0412 0.0270 0.0433 −0.0023 −0.0027 −0.0026 −0.0031
(0.0251) (0.0271) (0.0309) (0.02634) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Selectivity correction −0.0154 −0.0158* −0.0012* −0.0012*
(0.0100) (0.0094) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Wald test of joint significance (% p-value) 572.4 (0.0) 574.2 (0.0) 406.5 (0.0) 532.3 (0.0) 684.7 (0.0) 724.1 (0.0) 670.6 (0.0) 694.7 (0.0)
Hansen-Sargan test (% p-value) 54.6 (84.1) 53.0 (85.8) 53.5 (88.4) 51.9 (89.7) 260.4 (3.6) 260.8 (3.1) 251.0 (9.6) 256.8 (5.4)
AR(2) test (% p-value) −1.5 (14.0) −1.4 (16.9) −1.7 (9.0) −1.6 (12.2) −1.1 (24.9) −1.1 (24.9) −1.2 (23.3) −1.2 (23.2)
The lag (t−1 or t−2) is indicated to the left of each variable. Standard errors in italics are below each estimated coefficient. Time dummies and age dummies were included
in all estimations. The instrument set includes lags of the RHS variables at t−3, time, age and industry dummies. Due to the small sample size in the sample truncated on
the basis of positive related diversification, and to avoid that the number of instruments that were too large with respect to the number of truncated observations, in the
diversification equation, we exploit for each instrument one moment condition per lag instead of one moment condition per lag and per available year. In either case, the
main results did not substantially change. The p-values indicate the significance level below which the null hypothesis is rejected. The Hansen-Sargan test evaluates the null
hypothesis of validity of the over-identifying restrictions, and it is asymptotically distributed (under the null of validity) as a chi-square with as many degrees of freedom as
the number of over-identifying restrictions. The AR(2) test is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal under the null hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation in
the error term of the first-differences transformed model. This test is based on the fact that if the model is properly specified, the transformed error term should not exhibit
second order autocorrelation.
* Significance at the 10 percent level.
† Significance at the 5 percent level.
§ Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Tindex was, on average, approximately 0.49. This result indicates
that for a substantial proportion of diversifying firms, increas-
ing levels of related diversification have a negative effect on R&D
effort.
Fromtheestimates shown inTable5,wecancompute theeffects
over time of a change in one strategic variable on the other. The
effect after one year is simply the estimated coefficient of the cor-
responding variable at t−1. To compute the cumulative effect after
additional years, we must consider the coefficients of the lagged
dependent variables. Table 6 shows that the effects after one year
are remarkably smaller than the full effect, which takes several
years to complete.18 Together with the firm decision about either
to diversify in further related activities or to undertake further
effort in R&D activities, the firm may need to undergo organisa-
tional changes. As we have mentioned earlier, such changes are
usually costly, so that the firm may have incentives to gradually
distribute them over time rather than instantaneously implement
the full change.
18 Consider, for simplicity, the model yjit = ˛j + j1yji,t−1 + j2yji,t−2 + ıj1yki,t−1 +
X ′
jit
ˇj + ujit . The immediate effect (after 1 year) of yk on yj is given by the coef-
ficient 	j1 . To compute the full effect, it is convenient to rewrite the model as
yjit − j1yji,t−1 − j2yji,t−2 = ˛j + ıj1yki,t−1 + X ′jitˇj + ujit , and the full effect is simply
	j1/(1−j1 −j2).
l
d
a
sFor example, it takes approximately two years for 50% of the
ffect to take place, whereas the full effect requires approxi-
ately 10 years to reach completion. Further, the sign and the
ize of the effect of diversification on R&D depend on the level
f diversification. For this reason, we tabulated such effects for
everal levels of related diversification. Namely, for a firm that
nitially does not diversify, a 0.01 increase in related diversifi-
ation will lead, on average, to an increase in R&D intensity by
.07 percent after one year. The full effect is 0.26. For those firms
hose diversification index is 0.20, a 0.01 increase in diversifica-
ionwould increase R&D, on average, by 0.02 after one year. The full
ffect (approximately 10 years later) is 0.09. The effect becomes
ull for diversification levels around 0.30 and becomes negative
hereafter. Therefore, the complementaritybetweendiversification
nd R&D occurs at moderately low levels of related diversifica-
ion. Our results support Hypothesis 1b, whereby the effect of
elated diversification on R&D intensity is ruled by a U-shape pat-
ern.
With regard to the effect of R&D on diversification, we found
one-to-one effect after one year, but the overall effect, after
pproximately 10 years, is almost three times the one-year effect.
herefore,wefindempirical support forHypothesis 1,which estab-
ishes a bidirectional and dynamic relationship between related
iversification and R&D. In this dynamic context, the full effect of
change in R&D intensity on diversification and vice versa takes
everal years to reach completion.9
  
Table 6
Distribution of effects of a unit change over time.
Accum. effect % of full effect
R&D→Diversification
After 1 Year 1.01 35%
After 2 Years 1.66 58%
After 3 Years 2.09 73%
After 4 Years 2.36 83%
After 5 Years 2.53 89%
After 10 Years 2.82 99%
Full effect 2.86
Acum. effect for different diversification values % of full effect
dR =0.0 dR =0.1 dR =0.2 dR =0.3 dR =0.4 dR =0.5 dR =0.6
Diversification→R&D
After 1 Year 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.00 −0.03 −0.05 −0.08 27%
After 2 Years 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.00 −0.05 −0.09 −0.13 47%
After 3 Years 0.17 0.11 0.05 0.00 −0.06 −0.12 −0.18 61%
After 4 Years 0.20 0.13 0.06 −0.01 −0.07 −0.14 −0.21 72%
After 5 Years 0.22 0.14 0.07 −0.01 −0.08 −0.15 −0.23 79%
After 10 Years 0.26 0.17 0.08 −0.01 −0.10 −0.19 −0.28 96%
Full effect 0.27 0.18 0.09 −0.01 −0.10 −0.19 −0.29
Calculations based on dynamic panel data estimates from Table 5. The full effect is ˇ/(1 − 1 − 2), 1 and 2 being the coefficients of the lagged endogenous variable at t−1
and t−2, respectively.
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bTo evaluate the robustness of our results, we also considered
alternative sets of instruments. In particular, due to the small sam-
ple size in the sample truncated on the basis of positive related
diversification and to prevent the problem whereby the number of
instruments was too large with respect to the number of truncated
observations, we have exploited for each instrument one moment
condition per lag instead of one moment condition per lag and per
available year. In either case, the main results did not substantially
change. In addition, we have also considered additional lags of the
RHS at t−4. In all these alternative estimates (not reported here),
we found that thechoiceof instrumentsaffected theprecisionof the
estimates, but both the qualitative and quantitative results remain
unchanged.
7. Conclusions
Over the last several decades, many studies have empiri-
cally analysed the link between corporate diversification and R&D
intensity. However, they have provided contradictory evidence,
particularly with regard to the effect of R&D on diversification
The existing contributions differ in the companies and countries of
reference, and therefore, in their institutional environment and in
the prevailing mode of firm growth. Earlier empirical work relied
mostly on single cross-sections of data that focused on unidirec-
tional effects of one strategic variable on the other; the potential
feedback between both variables was not regarded. Finally, ear-
lier contributions differ in the statistical assumptions, particularly
in the treatment of potential sources of endogeneity. Our work,
motivated by this inconclusive evidence about the mutual effects
between R&D and diversification, contributes to this literature in
several ways.
We posited a bidirectional relation between these two deci-
sions and assessed it empirically by estimating a dynamic model
with longitudinal data of companies that pursue internal growth. In
particular, we used an unbalanced panel of Spanish manufacturing
companies between 1990 and 2001. Our empirical approach takes
into account firm-level unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity of
the right-hand-side variables, and the fact that the two strategic
variables are subject to censoring. The results assert the dynamic
nature of the relationship, on the one hand, and the existence
of feedback effects between both strategic variables on the other
hand.In particular, we found an unambiguous positive effect of R&D
n related diversification. There is a one-to-one effect of an R&D
ncrease on related diversification after one year. Significant inertia
n diversification results in an R&D increase on diversification over
10-year period, which is considerably larger than the one-year
ffect. The effect of related diversification on R&D intensity was
onlinear. The effect is positive but decreasing up to a certain level
f related diversification; eventually, it becomes negative when
elated diversification becomes high enough. Unrelated diversifi-
ation, though, has no significant effect on R&D. Unlike unrelated
iversification, related diversification reinforces the benefits of
ynergies (leading to an increase in technological resource endow-
ents) and economies of scope (favouring a more efficient use
f such resources). Our results suggest that diversifying in related
ctivities, at least up to moderate levels, may increase the return
o innovation in two instances. First, firms are more prompted to
nnovate to consolidate their position in the new activities. Sec-
nd, firms become more efficient in R&D expenditure. We have
lso found that innovation activity creates incentives to the firms
o branch out into new, related activities. Both strategic decisions
xhibit abidirectional anddynamic relationship, bywhich feedback
ffects are distributed over time. This result implies that the firms
nd a method to distribute changes over time in these two strate-
ic variables, instead of adjusting instantaneously to their optimal
evels because it is less costly to introduce such changes gradually.
his perspective may have important research implications on the
ffects of diversification on performance.
Our results are also relevant from the managerial point of
iew. The results suggest the convenience of an integrated
pproach to the strategic decisions about increasing techno-
ogical resources through R&D investment and about becoming
nvolved in new related businesses. These two strategic decisions
xhibit, in many instances, an important degree of complemen-
arity. Although the planning of the different strategic decisions
ight depend on different decision-units within the firm, coor-
ination among them can greatly improve the efficiency in
ecision-making. In this sense, the firm knowledge about the
elationship between growth and technological resources can
elp it to design a coherent policy establishing the objectives
f the different decision-units. It must also be pointed out
hat the effects of strategic decisions are not instantaneous,
ut they are distributed over several years. Therefore, time10
  
Table A.1
Distribution of companies by industry and by size.
Industry (2-digit SIC code) Size
Small Medium Large All
Iron, steel and metal (22) 4 1 19 24
Building materials (24) 7 10 17 34
Chemicals (25) 14 13 33 60
Non-ferrous metals (31) 14 17 17 48
Machinery (32+33) 12 14 18 44
Electric materials (34) 12 6 20 38
Electronic (35) 4 5 11 20
Motor vehicles (36) 2 7 26 35
Ship building (37) 1 1 2 4
Other motor vehicles (38) 0 0 7 7
Precision instruments (39) 0 2 3 5
Non-elaborated food (41) 5 6 17 28
Food, tobacco & drinks (42) 3 2 15 20
Basic Textile (43) 5 10 16 31
Leather (44) 2 1 0 3
Garment (45) 15 7 8 30
Wood and furniture (46) 5 3 5 13
Cellulose and paper edition (47) 4 10 17 31
Plastic materials (48) 8 12 8 28
Other non-basic (49) 4 2 4 10
All 121 129 263 513
Source: Sample selected by the authors from Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales
(ESEE).
Firms are broken down by Size, in accordance with their average employment, as
Small (up to 100 employees), Medium (between 100 and 250 employees) and Large
(more than 250 employees).
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Bplanning must be taken into account for these two strategic deci-
sions.
The main results also acknowledge the importance of perform-
ing a proper treatment of the potential sources of endogeneity in
the empirical analysis, since disregarding these problems would
lead to misleading conclusions. Unobserved heterogeneity should
always be taken into account in empirical applications with firm-
level data, since, no matter how many covariates we control,
relevant unobserved characteristics of such firms potentially cor-
related with the existing covariates will generally remain. This
problem is usually disregarded in the literature, with some excep-
tions. In many cases, this could be due to the lack of longitudinal
data. We think that the proper econometric treatment of these
problems may produce a relative loss of precision in the estimates.
Nevertheless, this loss of precision should not lead one to disre-
gard these problems because the alternative estimates would be
inconsistent, and therefore meaningless, no matter how precise
they might be.
Unlike most empirical work regarding this issue based on US
companies, our analysis focused on firms that operate in settings
where firms are more prone to organic growth. Thus, our results
contribute to abetter understanding about the linkbetween related
diversification and R&D in alternative institutional frameworks.
The importance of the institutional frameworkwas posed byMayer
and Whittington (2003).19 In comparison with US companies,
which are the basis for most empirical work about diversification,
European firms are smaller and more prone to internal growth.
Therefore, the conclusions from US studies cannot necessarily be
extrapolated to most European countries. Furthermore, this is the
first work in which the link between diversification and R&D,
focused solely on internal growth, has been analysed. The sole focus
on internal growth further contributes to extending research in
this area. Of course, our approach leaves aside strategies of exter-
nal growth, firm splits, or cooperation modes between firms that
may induce differences in a firm’s strategies about diversification
and R&D. These alternative strategies deserve further research and
would provide more complete evidence about the link between
diversification and R&D under different growth modes. These dif-
ferent strategies should be isolated, however, to elucidate this link
in each particular case.
The method of measuring our two strategic variables is worth
noting. Whereas the diversification measures, based on entropy
indices, are commonly acknowledged in empirical work, there is
no general agreement about the best measure of firm technologi-
cal activity. These measures are often determined by the available
data. In our case, we used R&D intensity to measure firm techno-
logical activity. Our conclusions may differ under other alternative
measures: internal vs. external, or at the input vs. at the output
level. We believe that it will be important to test our hypothe-
sis under alternative measures of technological resources in future
studies.
Our study highlights the importance of accounting for dynam-
ics in the analysis of corporate diversification. The conceptual
and empirical approach developed in this work, considering
the dynamic effects of the relationship between resources
and corporate diversification, will be an important contri-
bution to future theoretical and empirical studies in the
analysis of corporate diversification. In this context, a robust
empirical approach acquires special importance. The econo-
metric approach that we propose here may be a helpful
benchmark for future research aimed at evaluating other impli-
19 The home country environment is characterized by features and institutions
(Wan and Hoskisson, 2003) that determine both the allocations of technological
resources and the diversification strategies of the companies.ations of the resource-based view, such as the relationship
etween diversification decisions, resources, and corporate perfor-
ance.
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